Legal Blog: October 2011

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Monday, October 31, 2011

The Doctrine of 'Ejusdem Generis' : Supreme Court Explains

Justice Ganguly
Supreme Court of India
The Supreme Court in Maharashtra University of Health and others v. Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal & Others has examined and explained the meaning of 'Ejusdem Generis' as a rule of interpretation of statutes in our legal system. While examining the doctrine, the Supreme Court held as under;

26. The Latin expression “ejusdem generis” which means “of the same kind or nature” is a principle of construction, meaning thereby when general words in a statutory text are flanked by restricted words, the meaning of the general words are taken to be restricted by implication with the meaning of restricted words. This is a principle which arises “from the linguistic implication by which words having literally a wide meaning (when taken in isolation) are treated as reduced in scope by the verbal context.” It may be regarded as an instance of ellipsis, or reliance on implication. This principle is presumed to apply unless there is some contrary indication (See Glanville Williams, ‘The Origins and Logical Implications of the Ejusdem Generis Rule’ 7 Conv (NS) 119). 

27. This ejusdem generis principle is a facet of the principle of Noscitur a sociis. The Latin maxim Noscitur a sociis contemplates that a statutory term is recognised by its associated words. The Latin word ‘sociis’ means ‘society’. Therefore, when general words are juxtaposed with specific words, general words cannot be read in isolation. Their colour and their contents are to be derived from their context [See similar observations of Viscount Simonds in Attorney General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover, (1957) AC 436 at 461 of the report]

28. But like all other linguistic canons of construction, the ejusdem generis principle applies only when a contrary intention does not appear. In instant case, a contrary intention is clearly indicated inasmuch as the definition of ‘teachers’ under Section 2(35) of the said Act, as pointed out above, is in two parts. The first part deals with enumerated categories but the second part which begins by the expression “and other” envisages a different category of persons. Here ‘and’ is disjunctive. So, while construing such a definition the principle of ejusdem generis cannot be applied.

29. In this context, we should do well to remember the caution sounded by Lord Scarman in Quazi v. Quazi – [(1979) 3 All-England Reports 897]. At page 916 of the report, the learned Law Lord made this pertinent observation:- “If the legislative purpose of a statute is such that a statutory series should be read ejusdem generis, so be it; the rule is helpful. But, if it is not, the rule is more likely to defeat than to fulfil the purpose of the statute. The rule, like many other rules of statutory interpretation, is a useful servant but a bad master.” 

30. This Court while construing the principle of ejusdem generis laid down similar principles in the case of K.K. Kochuni v. State of Madras and Kerala, [AIR 1960 SC 1080]. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Kochuni (supra) speaking through Justice Subba Rao (as His Lordship then was) at paragraph 50 at page 1103 of the report opined:- 
“...The rule is that when general words follow particular and specific words of the same nature, the general words must be confined to the things of the same kind as those specified. But it is clearly laid down by decided cases that the specific words must form a distinct genus or category. It is not an inviolable rule of law, but is only permissible inference in the absence of an indication to the contrary.” 
31. Again this Court in another Constitution Bench decision in the case of Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. The Collector of Excise, Govt. of Tripura, Agartala and others, AIR 1972 SC 1863, speaking through Justice Dua, reiterated the same principles in paragraph 9, at page 1868 of the report. On the principle of ejusdem generis, the learned Judge observed as follows:-
“…The ejusdem generis rule strives to reconcile the incompatibility between specific and general words. This doctrine applies when (i) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words; (ii) the subjects of the enumeration constitute a class or category; (iii) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) the general term follows the enumeration; and (v) there is no indication of a different legislative intent.” 
32. As noted above, in the instant case, there is a statutory indication to the contrary. Therefore, where there is statutory indication to the contrary the definition of teacher under Section 2(35) cannot be read on the basis of ejusdem generis nor can the definition be confined to only approved teachers. If that is done, then a substantial part of the definition under Section 2(35) would become redundant. That is against the very essence of the doctrine of ejusdem generis. The purpose of this doctrine is to reconcile any incompatibility between specific and general words so that all words in a Statute can be given effect and no word becomes superfluous (See Sutherland: Statutory Construction, 5th Edition, page 189, Volume 2A).

33. It is also one of the cardinal canons of construction that no Statute can be interpreted in such a way as to render a part of it otiose.

34. It is, therefore, clear where there is a different legislative intent, as in this case, the principle of ejusdem generis cannot be applied to make a part of the definition completely redundant.

35. By giving such a narrow and truncated interpretation of `teachers' under Section 2(35), High court has not only ignored a part of Section 2(35) but it has also unfortunately given an interpretation which is incompatible with the avowed purpose of Section 53 of the Act.

Sunday, October 23, 2011

Dying Declaration - Evidentiary Value : The Law

Justice P. Sathasivam
Supreme Court of India
The Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar Vs. State of Haryana has discussed the law relating to the evidentiary value of a dying declaration and whether such a piece of evidence can be the sole factor for convicting an accused. The Court has referred and relied on a number of judicial precedents and summed up the legal position as under; 

6. Before considering the acceptability of dying declaration (Ex.PD), it would be useful to refer the legal position.

(i) In Sham Shankar Kankaria vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 13 SCC 165, this Court held as under:
"10. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on deathbed is so solemn and serene when he is dying that the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in law to accept veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eyewitness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the court without a scrap of evidence.
11. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which c ould be summed up as under as indicated in Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474 (SCC pp.480 -8 1, para 18)
(Emphasis supplied)
(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja v. State of M.P.,(1976) 3 SCC 104)

(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, (1985) 1 SCC 552 and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar,(1983) 1 SCC 211)

(iii) The Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (See K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 618)

(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P.,(1974) 4 SCC 264)

(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See Kake Singh v. State of M.P., 1981 Supp SCC 25)

(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath v. State of U.P.,(1981) 2 SCC 654)

(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu, 1980 Supp SCC 455)

(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar,1980 Supp SCC 769)

(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P.,1988 Supp SCC 152)

(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (See State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan, (1989) 3 SCC 390)

(xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC 700)"

(ii) In Puran Chand vs. State of Haryana, (2010) 6 SCC 566, this Court once again reiterated the abovementioned principles.

(iii) In Panneerselvam vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2008) 17 SCC 190, a Bench of three Judges of this Court reiterating various principles mentioned above held that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of the conviction unless it is corroborated and the rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.

Thursday, October 20, 2011

Distinction Between a 'Math' & 'Temple' : The Law

Justice R.V. Raveendran
Supreme Court of India
The Supreme Court in Parasamaya Kolerinatha Madam, Tirunelveli Vs. P.Natesa Achari has cast a distinction between the definition, use and purpose of a 'Math' and a 'Temple' and has further gone on to lay tests to determine whether an endowment is of a private or of a public nature. The relevant extracts from the judgment are as under;

7. As all these questions are interconnected, we will consider them together. We may at first refer to the definitions of the words `Math' and `Temple' in the Act. Section 6(13) of the Act defines `Math' thus : 
"Math means a Hindu religious institution with properties attached thereto and presided over by a person, the succession to whose office devolves in accordance with the direction of the founder of the institution or is regulated by usage and (i) whose duty it is to engage himself in imparting religious instruction or rendering spiritual service; or (ii) who exercises or claims to exercise spiritual headship over a body of disciples; and includes places of religious worship or instruction which are appurtenant to the institution. xxx xxx" 
Section 6(20) of the said Act defines the term "temple" as "Temple means a place by whatever designation known used as a place of public religious worship, and dedicated to, or for the benefit of, or used as of right by, the Hindu community or of any section thereof, as a place of public religious worship. xxx xxx" 

8. The distinction between maths and temples, stated in several judicial pronouncement has found statutory recognition in the aforesaid definitions. There are two necessary ingredients for a structure or place to be described as a temple under the Act. First is its use as a place of public religious worship. Second is dedication of the structure or place to, or for the benefit of, or use as of right by, the Hindu community or a section thereof, as a place of public religious worship. The mere fact that members of the public are allowed to worship at a place, will not make it a public temple. The Hindu sentiments and the tenets of Hinduism do not normally exclude worshippers from a place of worship, even when it is private or part of a Math. Therefore, the crucial test is not whether the members of the public are permitted to worship, but whether the worship by the members of the public is as of right by the Hindu community or any section thereof, or whether a place has been dedicated a place of public religious worship. [See : the decision of the Privy Council in Mundacheri Koman vs. Atchuthan - ILR 58 Mad. 91, the decisions of the Madras High Court in Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board vs. Deivanai Ammal - 1953 (2) MLJ 688; Bodendraswami Mutt vs. The President of the Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments - 1955 (1) MLJ 60, and The Commissioner, Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowment (Admn.) Department vs. T.A.T. Srimath Gnaniar Madalayam - 2003 (1) MLJ 726]. 

9. In Goswami Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs. Shah Ranchhoddas Kalidas (Dead) & Ors. - AIR 1970 SC 2025 and T.D. Gopalan vs. The Commissioner of Hindu Religions and Charitable Endowments, Madras - AIR 1972 SC 1716, this Court held that the origin of the temple, the manner in which the affairs are managed, the gifts received by it, the rights exercised by devotees in regard to worship therein and the consciousness of the devotees themselves as to the character of the temple, are the factors which go to show whether a temple is a public temple or a private temple. It is also well-settled that mere installation and consecration of idols in a place will not make it a place of public religious worship. Where the evidence shows that the disputed property retained the identity as a Math and where Gurupoojas (functions celebrating/important days associated with the founder or head of the math) are performed regularly, it will not lose the characteristic of a Math and become a temple, merely because idols have been installed and members of a section of Hindu community offer worship. In fact, this fact is now statutorily recognized in the definition of Math in section 6(13) of the Act which makes it clear that a Math includes any place of religious worship which is appurtenant to the institution of a Math. 

10. This Court in Radhakanta Deb vs. The Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa [AIR 1981 SC 798] on a conspectus of earlier authorities, laid down the following tests to provide sufficient guidelines to determine on the facts of each case, whether an endowment is of a private or a public nature : 
"Thus, on a conspectus of the authorities mentioned above, the following tests may be laid down as providing sufficient guidelines to determine on the facts of each case whether an endowment is of a private or of a public nature : 
(1) Where the origin of the endowment cannot be ascertained, the question whether the user of the temple by member of the public is as of right; 
(2) The fact that the control and management vests either in a large body of persons or in the members of the public and the founder does not retain any control over the management. Allied to this may be a circumstance where the evidence shows that there is provision for a scheme to be framed by associating the members of the public at large; 
(3) Where, however, a document is available to prove the nature and origin of the endowment and the recitals of the document show that the control and management of the temple is retained with the founder or his descendants, and that extensive properties are dedicated for the purpose of the maintenance of the temple belonging to the founder himself, this will be a conclusive proof to show that the endowment was of a private nature; 
(4) Where the evidence shows that the founder of the endowment did not make any stipulation for offerings or contributions to be made by members of the public to the temple, this would be an important intrinsic circumstance to indicate the private nature of the endowment." 
(emphasis supplied) 
11. We may also in this context refer to one of the earliest judgments of the Madras High Court. In Thambu Chetti Subraya Chetti vs. A.T. Arundel - ILR 6 (1883) Mad. 287. The question considered therein was whether a building known as the Dharma Sivachari Mattam could be considered to be a place of public worship, as idols were installed in the said Math premises, so that exemption from payment of municipal tax could be availed. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court held : 
"The original signification of the term Math or Matha is a building or set of buildings in which Hindu religious mendicants reside under a superior, who is called a Mahant. This spiritual superior is regarded with veneration by the members of the sect, and is installed with some ceremony, and not infrequently receives an honorific title. Although a place of worship is not a necessary part of a Math, such a place is, as may be expected, often found in such institutions, and, though intended primarily for the use of the inmates, the public may be admitted to it, and so this part of the building may become a place of religious worship. A Hindu Math somewhat resembles a Catholic Monastery. From the circumstance that a portion of it is not infrequently devoted to worship, and that the public may be admitted to it, the term Math has acquired a secondary signification as a small temple. Taking the whole of the facts mentioned in the judgment, we see reason to think that the institution was a Math in the original rather than the secondary sense of that term.............when the Mattam is in part of in whole used for purposes other than those of public worship, it will be liable to taxation." 
(emphasis supplied) 
12. Therefore, the fact that there are some idols installed in a Math and members of the public offer worship to such idol will not make it a place of public religious worship, that is, a temple, if the other ingredients of a math exist or if it is established to be a premises belonging to a math and used by the math for its purposes. If the property in its origin was a math property, it cannot be treated as a temple merely because the math had installed idols and permitted worship by the members of the community and the premises is used for rendering charitable and religious services. The Division Bench has proceeded on the erroneous impression that existence of an idol in a math property, when worshipped by the members of the community, would convert the math property into a temple.

Devolution of Coparcenary Property to Hindu Females : The Law

Justice R.M. Lodha
Supreme Court of India
The Supreme Court in Ganduri Koteshwaramma Vs. Chakiri Yanadi has discussed the law relating to intestate succession by Hindu females and the effect of the amendment to the Hindu Succession Act. While dealing with the effect of the amendment in the Hindu Succession Act, in a suit for partition of ancestral property, the Supreme Court has observed as under;

12. 1956 Act is an Act to codify the law relating to intestate succession among Hindus. This Act has brought about important changes in the law of succession but without affecting the special rights of the members of a Mitakshara Coparcenary. The Parliament felt that non-inclusion of daughters in the Mitakshara Coparcenary property was causing discrimination to them and, accordingly, decided to bring in necessary changes in the law. The statement of objects and reasons of the 2005 Amendment Act, inter alia, reads as under : 
".......The retention of the Mitakshara coparcenary property without including the females in it means that the females cannot inherit in ancestral property as their male counterparts do. The law by excluding the daughter from participating in the coparcenary ownership not only contributes to her discrimination on the ground of gender but also has led to oppression and negation of her fundamental right of equality guaranteed by the Constitution. Having regard to the need to render social justice to women, the States of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Maharashtra have made necessary changes in the law giving equal right to daughters in Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary property." 
13. With the above object in mind, the Parliament substituted the existing Section 6 of the 1956 Act by a new provision vide 2005 Amendment Act. After substitution, the new Section 6 reads as follows : 

"6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property.— 

(1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall,- - 

(a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son; 

(b) have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son; 

(c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son, and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004. 

(2) Any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of sub-section (1) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force in, as property capable of being disposed of by her by testamentary disposition. 

(3) Where a Hindu dies after the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, his interest in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship, and the coparcenary property shall be deemed to have been divided as if a partition had taken place and,-- 

(a) the daughter is allotted the same share as is allotted to a son; 

(b) the share of the pre-deceased son or a pre- deceased daughter, as they would have got had they been alive at the time of partition, shall be allotted to the surviving child of such pre-deceased son or of such pre-deceased daughter; and 

(c) the share of the pre-deceased child of a pre- deceased son or of a pre-deceased daughter, as such child would have got had he or she been alive at the time of the partition, shall be allotted to the child of such pre-deceased child of the pre- deceased son or a pre-deceased daughter, as the case may be. 

Explanation.-- For the purposes of this sub-section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. 

(4) After the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, no court shall recognise any right to proceed against a son, grandson or great-grandson for the recovery of any debt due from his father, grandfather or great-grandfather solely on the ground of the pious obligation under the Hindu law, of such son, grandson or great- grandson to discharge any such debt: Provided that in the case of any debt contracted before the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect – 

(a) the right of any creditor to proceed against the son, grandson or great- grandson, as the case may be; or 

(b) any alienation made in respect of or in satisfaction of, any such debt, and any such right or alienation shall be enforceable under the rule of pious obligation in the same manner and to the same extent as it would have been enforceable as if the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 had not been enacted. Explanation.--For the purposes of clause (a), the expression "son", "grandson" or "great-grandson" shall be deemed to refer to the son, grandson or great-grandson, as the case may be, who was born or adopted prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. 

(5) Nothing contained in this section shall apply to a partition, which has been effected before the 20th day of December, 2004. 

Explanation. --For the purposes of this section "partition" means any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) or partition effected by a decree of a court." 

14. The new Section 6 provides for parity of rights in the coparcenary property among male and female members of a joint Hindu family on and from September 9, 2005. The Legislature has now conferred substantive right in favour of the daughters. According to the new Section 6, the daughter of a copercener becomes a coparcener by birth in her own rights and liabilities in the same manner as the son. The declaration in Section 6 that the daughter of the coparcener shall have same rights and liabilities in the coparcenary property as she would have been a son is unambiguous and unequivocal. Thus, on and from September 9, 2005, the daughter is entitled to a share in the ancestral property and is a coparcener as if she had been a son. 

15. The right accrued to a daughter in the property of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara Law, by virtue of the 2005 Amendment Act, is absolute, except in the circumstances provided in the proviso appended to sub-section (1) of Section 6. The excepted categories to which new Section 6 of the 1956 Act is not applicable are two, namely, (i) where the disposition or alienation including any partition has taken place before December 20, 2004; and (ii) where testamentary disposition of property has been made before December 20, 2004. Sub- section (5) of Section 6 leaves no room for doubt as it provides that this Section shall not apply to the partition which has been effected before December 20, 2004. For the purposes of new Section 6 it is explained that `partition' means any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act 1908 or partition effected by a decree of a court. In light of a clear provision contained in the Explanation appended to sub-section (5) of Section 6, for determining the non- applicability of the Section, what is relevant is to find out whether the partition has been effected before December 20, 2004 by deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 or by a decree of a court. In the backdrop of the above legal position with reference to Section 6 brought in the 1956 Act by the 2005 Amendment Act, the question that we have to answer is as to whether the preliminary decree passed by the trial court on March 19, 1999 and amended on September 27, 2003 deprives the appellants of the benefits of 2005 Amendment Act although final decree for partition has not yet been passed.

Saturday, October 15, 2011

Award of Compensation in Cheque Bounce Cases : The Law

Justice R.V. Raveendran
The Supreme Court in R. Vijayan v. Baby has examined the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code with regard to payment of compensation in cases relating to dishonour of cheques. The Court has also suggested a levy of a uniform fines / compensation in cases of conviction, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to bring about uniformity in judicial decisions. The relevant extracts from this important judgment are reproduced hereinbelow;

5. Section 138 of the Act provided that where a cheque is dishonoured, the person drawing the cheque shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of the Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque or with both. It may be mentioned that subsequent to the judgment of the learned Magistrate, the said Section 138 was amended (with effect from 6.2.2003) increasing and the period of imprisonment imposable to two years. 

6. Section 357 relates to Order to pay compensation. 

"357. Order to pay compensation.— 

(1) When a Court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence (including a sentence of death) of which fine forms a part, the Court may, when passing judgment order the whole or any part of the fine recovered to be applied --- 
(a) in defraying the expenses properly incurred in the prosecution; 
(b) in the payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence, when compensation is, in the opinion of the Court, recoverable by such person in a Civil Court; 
(c) & 
(d) x x x x (not relevant) (2) x x x x x (not relevant) 
(3) When a Court imposes a sentence, of which fine does not form a part, the Court may, when passing judgment order the accused person to pay, by way of compensation such amount as may be specified in the order to the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused person has been so sentenced." 
(4) An order under this section may also be made by an Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of sessions when exercising its power of revision. 
(5) At the time of awarding compensation in any subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter, the court shall take into account any sum paid or recovered as compensation under this section. 
7. Sub-section (3) of section 357, is categorical that the compensation can be awarded only where fine does not form part of the sentence. Section 357(3) has been the subject-matter of judicial interpretation by this Court in several decisions. In State of Punjab vs. Gurmej Singh [2002 (6) SCC 663], this Court held : 
"A reading of sub-section (3) of Section 357 would show that the question of award of compensation would arise where the court imposes a sentence of which fine does not form a part." 
This Court also held that section 357(3) will not apply where a sentence of fine has been imposed. 

8. In Sivasuriyan vs. Thangavelu [2004 (13) SCC 795], this Court held : 
"In view of the submissions made, the only question that arises for consideration is whether the court can direct payment of compensation in exercise of power under sub- section (3) of Section 357 in a case where fine already forms a part of the sentence. Apart from sub-section (3) of Section 357 there is no other provision under the Code whereunder the court can exercise such power:" 
After extracting section 357(3) of the Code, the Court proceeded to hold thus: 
"On a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is crystal clear that the power can be exercised only when the court imposes sentence by which fine does not form a part. In the case in hand, a court having sentenced to imprisonment, as also fine, the power under sub-section (3) of Section 357 could not have been exercised. In that view of the matter, the impugned direction of the High Court directing payment of compensation to the tune of Rs. one lakh by the appellant is set aside." 
9. It is evident from Sub-Section (3) of section 357 of the Code, that where the sentence imposed does not include a fine, that is, where the sentence relates to only imprisonment, the court, when passing judgment, can direct the accused to pay, by way of compensation, such amount as may be specified in the order to the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused person has been so sentenced. The reason for this is obvious. Sub-section (1) of section 357 provides that where the court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence of which fine forms a part, the Court may direct the fine amount to be applied in the payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence, when compensation is, in the opinion of the court, recoverable by such person in a Civil Court. Thus, if compensation could be paid from out of the fine, there is no need to award separate compensation. Only where the sentence does not include fine but only imprisonment and the court finds that the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act of the accused person, requires to be compensated, it is permitted to award compensation under compensation under section 357(3). 

10. The difficulty arises in this case because of two circumstances. The fine levied is only Rs.2000/-. The compensation required to cover the loss/injury on account of the dishonour of the cheque is Rs.20,000/-. The learned Magistrate having levied fine of Rs.2,000/-, it is impermissible to levy any compensation having regard to section 357(3) of the Code. The question is whether the fine can be increased to cover the sum of Rs. 20,000/- which was the loss suffered by the complainant, so that the said amount could be paid as compensation under section 357(1)(b) of the Code. As noticed above, section 138 of the Act authorizes the learned Magistrate to impose by way of fine, an amount which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, with or without imprisonment. Section 29 of the Code deals with the sentences which Magistrates may pass. The Chief Judicial Magistrate is empowered to pass any sentence authorized by law (except sentence of death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years). On the other hand, sub-section (2) of Section 29 empowers a court of a Magistrate of First Class to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or fine not exceeding Rs.5,000/- or of both. (Note : By Act No.25 of 2005, sub-section (2) of Section 29 was amended with effect from 23.6.2006 and the maximum fine that could be levied by the Magistrate of First Class, was increased to Rs.10,000/-). 

At the relevant point of time, the maximum fine that the First Class Magistrate could impose was Rs.5,000/-. Therefore, it is also not possible to increase the fine to Rs.22,000/- so that Rs.20,000/- could be awarded as compensation, from the amount recovered as fine. 

11. The first respondent was a widow and police woman. On the facts and circumstances the learned Magistrate thought fit to impose only a fine and not imprisonment. When the conviction was set aside, the appellant filed a revision, challenging the non-grant of compensation of Rs. 20,000/-. He did not however challenge the non-imposition of sentence of imprisonment. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that once the sentence consists of only fine, the power under Section 357(3) could not be invoked for directing payment of compensation. The High Court was also justified in not converting the sentence from fine to imprisonment, so enable itself to award compensation, as the facts and circumstances of the case did not warrant imprisonment. Therefore, we are of the view that the order of High Court does not call for interference. 

12. It is of some interest to note, though may not be of any assistance in this case, that the difficulty caused by the ceiling imposed by section 29(2) of the Code has been subsequently solved by insertion of section 143 in the Act (by Amendment Act No.55 of 2002) with effect from 6.2.2003. Section 143(1) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, all offences under Chapter XVII of the Act should be tried by a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of sections 262 to 265 of the Code (relating to summary trials) shall, as far as may be, apply to such trials. The proviso thereto provides that it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term extending one year and an amount of fine exceeding Rs.5,000/-, in case of conviction in a summary trial under that section. In view of conferment of such special power and jurisdiction upon the First Class Magistrate, the ceiling as to the amount of fine stipulated in section 29(2) of the Code is removed. Consequently, in regard to any prosecution for offences punishable under section 138 of the Act, a First Class Magistrate may impose a fine exceeding Rs.5000/-, the ceiling being twice the amount of the cheque. 

13. This case relates to dishonour of cheque in the year 1995. Though the complainant-appellant has succeeded in obtaining a conviction, he has virtually lost in the sense he did not get compensation to recover the amount of the dishonoured cheque. As the limitation for filing a civil suit expired during the pendency of the appeal before the sessions court, the appellant has also lost the opportunity of recovering the amount by way of civil suit. In view of this peculiar position, we requested Dr. Rajiv Dhavan, senior counsel, to assist us as an Amicus Curiae to suggest methods to improve the disposal of cases under section 138 of the Act and also improve the relief that could be granted in such cases. In the meantime a three Judge Bench of this Court in Damodar S.Prabhu vs. Sayed Babalal H. [2010 (5) SCC 663], addressed the question of reluctance of offenders to compound the cases at earlier stages of the case prosecution leading to a huge pendency of cheque dishonour cases, and issued the following guidelines proposing levy of `a graded scale of fine' to encourage compounding at earlier stages of the case : 
"(a) That directions can be given that the Writ of Summons be suitably modified making it clear to the accused that he could make an application for compounding of the offences at the first or second hearing of the case and that if such an application is made, compounding may be allowed by the court without imposing any costs on the accused. 
(b) If the accused does not make an application for compounding as aforesaid, then if an application for compounding is made before the Magistrate at a subsequent stage, compounding can be allowed subject to the condition that the accused will be required to pay 10% of the cheque amount to be deposited as a condition for compounding with the Legal Services Authority, or such authority as the Court deems fit. 
(c) Similarly, if the application for compounding is made before the Sessions Court or a High Court in revision or appeal, such compounding may be allowed on the condition that the accused pays 15% of the cheque amount by way of costs. 
(d) Finally, if the application for compounding is made before the Supreme Court, the figure would increase to 20% of the cheque amount. 

The graded scheme for imposing costs is a means to encourage compounding at an early stage of litigation. In the status quo, valuable time of the Court is spent on the trial of these cases and the parties are not liable to pay any Court fee since the proceedings are governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, even though the impact of the offence is largely confined to the private parties. Even though the imposition of costs by the competent court is a matter of discretion, the scale of costs has been suggested in the interest of uniformity. The competent Court can of course reduce the costs with regard to the specific facts and circumstances of a case, while recording reasons in writing for such variance. Bona fide litigants should of course contest the proceedings to their logical end." 

14. We propose to address an aspect of the cases under section 138 of the Act, which is not dealt with in Damodar S. Prabhu. It is sometimes said that cases arising under section 138 of the Act are really civil cases masquerading as criminal cases. The avowed object of Chapter XVII of the Act is to "encourage the culture of use of cheques and enhance the credibility of the instrument". In effect, its object appears to be both punitive as also compensatory and restitutive, in regard to cheque dishonour cases. Chapter XVII of the Act is an unique exercise which blurs the dividing line between civil and criminal jurisdictions. It provides a single forum and single proceeding, for enforcement of criminal liability (for dishonouring the cheque) and for enforcement of the civil liability (for realization of the cheque amount) thereby obviating the need for the creditor to move two different fora for relief. This is evident from the following provisions of Chapter XVII of the Act. 

(i) The provision for levy of fine which is linked to the cheque amount and may extend to twice the amount of the cheque (section 138) thereby rendering section 357(3) virtually infructuous in so far as cheque dishonour cases. 

(ii) The provision enabling a First Class Magistrate to levy fine exceeding Rs.5,000/- (Section 143) notwithstanding the ceiling to the fine, as Rs.5,000/- imposed by section 29(2) of the Code; 

(iii) The provision relating to mode of service of summons (section 144) as contrasted from the mode prescribed for criminal cases in section 62 of the Code; 

(iv) The provision for taking evidence of the complainant by affidavit (section 145) which is more prevalent in civil proceedings, as contrasted from the procedure for recording evidence in the Code; 

(v) The provision making all offences punishable under section 138 of the Act compoundable. 

15. The apparent intention is to ensure that not only the offender is punished, but also ensure that the complainant invariably receives the amount of the cheque by way of compensation under section 357(1)(b) of the Code. Though a complaint under section 138 of the Act is in regard to criminal liability for the offence of dishonouring the cheque and not for the recovery of the cheque amount, (which strictly speaking, has to be enforced by a civil suit), in practice once the criminal complaint is lodged under section 138 of the Act, a civil suit is seldom filed to recover the amount of the cheque. This is because of the provision enabling the court to levy a fine linked to the cheque amount and the usual direction in such cases is for payment as compensation, the cheque amount, as loss incurred by the complainant on account of dishonour of cheque, under section 357 (1)(b) of the Code and the provision for compounding the offences under section 138 of the Act. Most of the cases (except those where liability is denied) get compounded at one stage or the other by payment of the cheque amount with or without interest. Even where the offence is not compounded, the courts tend to direct payment of compensation equal to the cheque amount (or even something more towards interest) by levying a fine commensurate with the cheque amount. A stage has reached when most of the complainants, in particular the financing institutions (particularly private financiers) view the proceedings under section 138 of the Act, as a proceeding for the recovery of the cheque amount, the punishment of the drawer of the cheque for the offence of dishonour, becoming secondary. 

16. Having reached that stage, if some Magistrates go by the traditional view that the criminal proceedings are for imposing punishment on the accused, either imprisonment or fine or both, and there is no need to compensate the complainant, particularly if the complainant is not a `victim' in the real sense, but is a well-to-do financier or financing institution, difficulties and complications arise. In those cases where the discretion to direct payment of compensation is not exercised, it causes considerable difficulty to the complainant, as invariably, by the time the criminal case is decided, the limitation for filing civil cases would have expired. As the provisions of Chapter XVII of the Act strongly lean towards grant of reimbursement of the loss by way of compensation, the courts should, unless there are special circumstances, in all cases of conviction, uniformly exercise the power to levy fine upto twice the cheque amount (keeping in view the cheque amount and the simple interest thereon at 9% per annum as the reasonable quantum of loss) and direct payment of such amount as compensation. Direction to pay compensation by way of restitution in regard to the loss on account of dishonour of the cheque should be practical and realistic, which would mean not only the payment of the cheque amount but interest thereon at a reasonable rate. Uniformity and consistency in deciding similar cases by different courts, not only increase the credibility of cheque as a negotiable instrument, but also the credibility of courts of justice. 

17. We are conscious of the fact that proceedings under section 138 of the Act cannot be treated as civil suits for recovery of the cheque amount with interest. We are also conscious of the fact that compensation awarded under section 357(1)(b) is not intended to be an elaborate exercise taking note of interest etc. Our observations are necessitated due to the need to have uniformity and consistency in decision making. In same type of cheque dishonour cases, after convicting the accused, if some courts grant compensation and if some other courts do not grant compensation, the inconsistency, though perfectly acceptable in the eye of law, will give rise to certain amount of uncertainty in the minds of litigants about the functioning of courts. Citizens will not be able to arrange or regulate their affairs in a proper manner as they will not know whether they should simultaneously file a civil suit or not. The problem is aggravated having regard to the fact that in spite of section 143(3) of the Act requiring the complaints in regard to cheque dishonour cases under section 138 of the Act to be concluded within six months from the date of the filing of the complaint, such cases seldom reach finality before three or four years let alone six months. These cases give rise to complications where civil suits have not been filed within three years on account of the pendency of the criminal cases. While it is not the duty of criminal courts to ensure that successful complainants get the cheque amount also, it is their duty to have uniformity and consistency, with other courts dealing with similar cases. 

18. One other solution is a further amendment to the provision of Chapter XVII so that in all cases where there is a conviction, there should be a consequential levy of fine of an amount sufficient to cover the cheque amount and interest thereon at a fixed rate of 9% per annum interest, followed by award of such sum as compensation from the fine amount. This would lead to uniformity in decisions, avoid multiplicity of proceedings (one for enforcing civil liability and another for enforcing criminal liability) and achieve the object of Chapter XVII of the Act, which is to increase the credibility of the instrument. This is however a matter for the Law Commission of India to consider.

Delhi High Court Gets 3 New Judges

R.V. Easwar
After a flurry of retirements and elevations, the Delhi High Court has got 3 new judges namely, Mr. R.V. Easwar, Ms. Pratibha Rani and Mr. Sat Paul Garg who have been appointed as Additional Judges of the Delhi High Court. The Official release from the Press Infromation Bureu reads as under;
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of article 224 of the Constitution of India, the President is pleased to appoint (1) Shri R.V. Easwar, (2) Shrimati Pratibha Rani, and (3) Shri Sat Paul Garg, to be Additional Judges of the Delhi High Court, in that order of seniority, for a period of two years with effect from the date they assume charge of their respective office.
R.V. Easwar currently holds the post of President of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ("ITAT") in Bombay, whereas Ms. Pratibha Rani and S.P. Garg are holding positions as District Judges.

The recommendation by the collegium for elevation of R.V. Easwars' name was recently challenged in a writ petition before the Delhi High Court. However, it is now unclear as to what fate the said writ petition would meet.

Meanwhile Justice Bharihoke, who had denied bail to the corporate honchos in the 2g scam, retired upon attaining the age of superannuation. 

Justice Bharihoke completed his LL.B from Punjab University, Chandigarh and joined Delhi Judicial Service on 07.12.1974. During his career he worked as Civil Judge, Metropolitan Magistrate, Additional Rent Controller, Senior Civil Judge and Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. Hw was appointed in Delhi Higher Judicial Service on 21.08.1995 and worked as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge, Special Judge Anti Corruption (CBI), Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal, Additional Rent Control Tribunal and additional charge of Additional Director, Delhi Judicial Academy. He also worked as Registrar, National Human Rights Commission on deputation from 19.05.2003 to 30.11.2006 and Registrar General in Delhi High Court w.e.f. 06.01.2007 to 13.05.2009. 

He was appointed as an Additional Judge in Delhi High Court on 14.05.2009 and retired on 14.10.2011

Friday, October 14, 2011

Validity of Sale by Execution of General Power of Attorney / Agreement to Sell / Will : The Law

Justice R.V. Raveendran
Supreme Court of India
The Supreme Court in an order passed in Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Anr. has discussed the ill effects of transfer of property by means of a General Power of Attorney / Will / Agreement to Sell, and the practical problems the same is causing. The Bench, while dealing with the legal validiity of such transfers, has observed as under;

By an earlier order dated 15.5.2009 [reported in Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt.Ltd. vs. State of Haryana & Anr. - 2009 (7) SCC 363], we had referred to the ill - effects of what is known as General Power of Attorney Sales (for short `GPA Sales') or Sale Agreement/General Power of Attorney/Will transfers (for short `SA/GPA/WILL' transfers). Both the descriptions are misnomers as there cannot be a sale by execution of a power of attorney nor can there be a transfer by execution of an agreement of sale and a power of attorney and will. As noticed in the earlier order, these kinds of transactions were evolved to avoid prohibitions/conditions regarding certain transfers, to avoid payment of stamp duty and registration charges on deeds of conveyance, to avoid payment of capital gains on transfers, to invest unaccounted money (`black money') and to avoid payment of `unearned increases' due to Development Authorities on transfer. 

2. The modus operandi in such SA/GPA/WILL transactions is for the vendor or person claiming to be the owner to receive the agreed consideration, deliver possession of the property to the purchaser and execute the following documents or variations thereof: 
(a) An Agreement of sale by the vendor in favour of the purchaser confirming the terms of sale, delivery of possession and payment of full consideration and undertaking to execute any document as and when required in future. Or An agreement of sale agreeing to sell the property, with a separate affidavit confirming receipt of full price and delivery of possession and undertaking to execute sale deed whenever required. 
(b) An Irrevocable General Power of Attorney by the vendor in favour of the purchaser or his nominee authorizing him to manage, deal with and dispose of the property without reference to the vendor. Or A General Power of Attorney by the vendor in favour of the purchaser or his nominee authorizing the attorney holder to sell or transfer the property and a Special Power of Attorney to manage the property. 
(c) A will bequeathing the property to the purchaser (as a safeguard against the consequences of death of the vendor before transfer is effected). 
These transactions are not to be confused or equated with genuine transactions where the owner of a property grants a power of Attorney in favour of a family member or friend to manage or sell his property, as he is not able to manage the property or execute the sale, personally. These are transactions, where a purchaser pays the full price, but instead of getting a deed of conveyance gets a SA/GPA/WILL as a mode of transfer, either at the instance of the vendor or at his own instance. Ill-Effects of SA/GPA/WILL transactions 

3. The earlier order dated 15.5.2009, noted the ill-effects of such SA/GPA/WILL transactions (that is generation of black money, growth of land mafia and criminalization of civil disputes) as under: 
"Recourse to `SA/GPA/WILL' transactions is taken in regard to freehold properties, even when there is no bar or prohibition regarding transfer or conveyance of such property, by the following categories of persons: 
(a) Vendors with imperfect title who cannot or do not want to execute registered deeds of conveyance. 
(b) Purchasers who want to invest undisclosed wealth/income in immovable properties without any public record of the transactions. The process enables them to hold any number of properties without disclosing them as assets held. 
(c) Purchasers who want to avoid the payment of stamp duty and registration charges either deliberately or on wrong advice. Persons who deal in real estate resort to these methods to avoid multiple stamp duties/registration fees so as to increase their profit margin. 
Whatever be the intention, the consequences are disturbing and far reaching, adversely affecting the economy, civil society and law and order. Firstly, it enables large scale evasion of income tax, wealth tax, stamp duty and registration fees thereby denying the benefit of such revenue to the government and the public. Secondly, such transactions enable persons with undisclosed wealth/income to invest their black money and also earn profit/income, thereby encouraging circulation of black money and corruption. 

This kind of transactions has disastrous collateral effects also. For example, when the market value increases, many vendors (who effected power of attorney sales without registration) are tempted to resell the property taking advantage of the fact that there is no registered instrument or record in any public office thereby cheating the purchaser. When the purchaser under such `power of attorney sales' comes to know about the vendors action, he invariably tries to take the help of musclemen to `sort out' the issue and protect his rights. On the other hand, real estate mafia many a time purchase properties which are already subject to power of attorney sale and then threaten the previous `Power of Attorney Sale' purchasers from asserting their rights. Either way, such power of attorney sales indirectly lead to growth of real estate mafia and criminalization of real estate transactions." 

It also makes title verification and certification of title, which is an integral part of orderly conduct of transactions relating to immovable property, difficult, if not impossible, giving nightmares to bonafide purchasers wanting to own a property with an assurance of good and marketable title. 

4. This Court had therefore requested the learned Solicitor General to give suggestions on behalf of Union of India. This Court also directed notice to States of Delhi, Haryana, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh to give their views on the matter. The four states have responded and confirmed that SA/GPA/WILL transfers required to be discouraged as they lead to loss of revenue (stamp duty) and increase in litigations due to defective title. They also referred to some measures taken in that behalf. The measures differ from State to State. In general, the measures are: 

(i) to amend Registration Act, 1908 by Amendment Act 48 of 2001 with effect from 24.9.2001 requiring documents containing contract to transfer for consideration (agreements of sale etc.) relating to any immoveable property for the purpose of section 53A of the Act, shall be registered; and 

(ii) to amend the stamp laws subjecting agreements of sale with delivery of possession and/or irrevocable powers of attorney in favour of non-family members authorizing sale, to the same stamp duty as deed of conveyance. These measures, no doubt, to some extent plugged the loss of revenue by way of stamp duty on account of parties having recourse to SA/GPA/WILL transactions, instead of executing deeds of conveyance. But the other ill-effects continued. Further such transaction which was only prevalent in Delhi and the surrounding areas have started spreading to other States also. Those with ulterior motives either to indulge in black money transactions or land mafia continue to favour such transactions. There are also efforts to thwart the amended provisions by not referring to delivery of possession in the agreement of sale and giving a separate possession receipt or an affidavit confirming delivery of possession and thereby avoiding the registration and stamp duty. The amendments to stamp and registration laws do not address the larger issue of generation of black money and operation of land mafia. The four States and the Union of India are however unanimous that SA/GPA/WILL transactions should be curbed and expressed their willingness to take remedial steps. 

5. The State of Haryana has however taken a further positive step by reducing the stamp duty on deeds of conveyance from 12.5% to 5%. A high rate of stamp duty acts as a damper for execution of deeds of conveyance for full value, and encourages SA/GPA/WILL transfers. When parties resort to SA/GPA/WILL transfers, the adverse effect is not only loss of revenue (stamp duty and registration charges) but the greater danger of generation of `black' money. Reducing the stamp duty on conveyance to realistic levels will encourage public to disclose the maximum sale value and have the sale deeds registered. Though the reduction of the stamp duty, may result in an immediate reduction in the revenue by way of stamp duty, in the long run it will be advantageous for two reasons: 

(i) parties will be encouraged to execute registered deeds of conveyance/sale deeds without any under valuation, instead of entering into SA/GPA/WILL transactions; and 

(ii) more and more sale transactions will be done by way of duly registered sale deeds, disclosing the entire sale consideration thereby reducing the generation of black money to a large extent. When high stamp duty is prevalent, there is a tendency to undervalue documents, even where sale deeds are executed. When properties are undervalued, a large part of the sale price changes hand by way of cash thereby generating `black' money. Even when the state governments take action to prevent undervaluation, it only results in the recovery of deficit stamp duty and registration charges with reference to the market value, but the actual sale consideration remains unaltered. If a property worth `5 millions is sold for `2 millions, the Undervaluation Rules may enable the state government to initiate proceedings so as to ensure that the deficit stamp duty and registration charges are recovered in respect of the difference of `3 millions. But the sale price remains `2 millions and the black money of `3 millions generated by the undervalued sale transaction, remains undisturbed. 

6. In this background, we will examine the validity and legality of SA/GPA/WILL transactions. We have heard learned Mr. Gopal Subramanian, Amicus Curiae and noted the views of the Government of NCT of Delhi, Government of Haryana, Government of Punjab and Government of Uttar Pradesh who have filed their submissions in the form of affidavits. 

Relevant Legal Provisions 

7. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (`TP Act' for short) defines `transfer of property' as under: 

"5. Transfer of Property defined : In the following sections "transfer of property" means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself [or to himself] and one or more other living persons; and "to transfer property" is to perform such act." 

xxx xxx 

Section 54 of the TP Act defines `sales' thus: "Sale" is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made. Such transfer, in the case of tangible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. 

Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. Contract for sale.-A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property." 

Section 53A of the TP Act defines `part performance' thus : 

"Part Performance. - Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract : Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof." 

8. We may next refer to the relevant provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, 1999 (Note : Stamp Laws may vary from state to state, though generally the provisions may be similar). Section 27 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 casts upon the party, liable to pay stamp duty, an obligation to set forth in the instrument all facts and circumstances which affect the chargeability of duty on that instrument. Article 23 prescribes stamp duty on `Conveyance'. In many States appropriate amendments have been made whereby agreements of sale acknowledging delivery of possession or power of Attorney authorizes the attorney to `sell any immovable property are charged with the same duty as leviable on conveyance. 

9. Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 which makes a deed of conveyance compulsorily registrable. We extract below the relevant portions of section 17. . 

"Section 17 - Documents of which registration is compulsory- (1) The following documents shall be registered, namely:-- xxxxx 

(b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property. 


(1A) The documents containing contracts to transfer for consideration, any immovable property for the purpose of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) shall be registered if they have been executed on or after the commencement of the Registration and Other Related laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 and if such documents are not registered on or after such commencement, then, they shall have no effect for the purposes of the said section 53A. 

Advantages of Registration 

10. In the earlier order dated 15.5.2009, the objects and benefits of registration were explained and we extract them for ready reference : 
"The Registration Act, 1908, was enacted with the intention of providing orderliness, discipline and public notice in regard to transactions relating to immovable property and protection from fraud and forgery of documents of transfer. This is achieved by requiring compulsory registration of certain types of documents and providing for consequences of non-registration. Section 17 of the Registration Act clearly provides that any document (other than testamentary instruments) which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether in present or in future "any right, title or interest" whether vested or contingent of the value of Rs. 100 and upwards to or in immovable property. Section 49 of the said Act provides that no document required by Section 17 to be registered shall, affect any immovable property comprised therein or received as evidence of any transaction affected such property, unless it has been registered. Registration of a document gives notice to the world that such a document has been executed. Registration provides safety and security to transactions relating to immovable property, even if the document is lost or destroyed. It gives publicity and public exposure to documents thereby preventing forgeries and frauds in regard to transactions and execution of documents. Registration provides information to people who may deal with a property, as to the nature and extent of the rights which persons may have, affecting that property. In other words, it enables people to find out whether any particular property with which they are concerned, has been subjected to any legal obligation or liability and who is or are the person/s presently having right, title, and interest in the property. It gives solemnity of form and perpetuate documents which are of legal importance or relevance by recording them, where people may see the record and enquire and ascertain what the particulars are and as far as land is concerned what obligations exist with regard to them. It ensures that every person dealing with immovable property can rely with confidence upon the statements contained in the registers (maintained under the said Act) as a full and complete account of all transactions by which the title to the property may be affected and secure extracts/copies duly certified." 
Registration of documents makes the process of verification and certification of title easier and simpler. It reduces disputes and litigations to a large extent. 

Scope of an Agreement of sale 

11. Section 54 of TP Act makes it clear that a contract of sale, that is, an agreement of sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam and Anr. (1977) 3 SCC 247, observed: 

A contract of sale does not of itself create any interest in, or charge on, the property. This is expressly declared in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. See Rambaran Prosad v. Ram Mohit Hazra [1967]1 SCR 293. 

The fiduciary character of the personal obligation created by a contract for sale is recognised in Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and in Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal obligation created by a contract of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising out of contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein." In India, the word `transfer' is defined with reference to the word `convey'. The word `conveys' in section 5 of Transfer of Property Act is used in the wider sense of conveying ownership... ...that only on execution of conveyance ownership passes from one party to another...." 

In Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra [2004 (8) SCC 614] this Court held: 
"Protection provided under Section 53A of the Act to the proposed transferee is a shield only against the transferor. It disentitles the transferor from disturbing the possession of the proposed transferee who is put in possession in pursuance to such an agreement. It has nothing to do with the ownership of the proposed transferor who remains full owner of the property till it is legally conveyed by executing a registered sale deed in favour of the transferee. Such a right to protect possession against the proposed vendor cannot be pressed in service against a third party." 
It is thus clear that a transfer of immoveable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immoveable property can be transferred. 

12. Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of sections 54 and 55 of TP Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property (except to the limited right granted under section 53A of TP Act). According to TP Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of TP Act enacts that sale of immoveable property can be made only by a registered instrument and an agreement of sale does not create any interest or charge on its subject matter. 

Scope of Power of Attorney 

13. A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in regard to any right, title or interest in an immovable property. The power of attorney is creation of an agency whereby the grantor authorizes the grantee to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor, which when executed will be binding on the grantor as if done by him (see section 1A and section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882). It is revocable or terminable at any time unless it is made irrevocable in a manner known to law. Even an irrevocable attorney does not have the effect of transferring title to the grantee. In State of Rajasthan vs. Basant Nehata - 2005 (12) SCC 77, this Court held : 
"A grant of power of attorney is essentially governed by Chapter X of the Contract Act. By reason of a deed of power of attorney, an agent is formally appointed to act for the principal in one transaction or a series of transactions or to manage the affairs of the principal generally conferring necessary authority upon another person. A deed of power of attorney is executed by the principal in favour of the agent. The agent derives a right to use his name and all acts, deeds and things done by him and subject to the limitations contained in the said deed, the same shall be read as if done by the donor. A power of attorney is, as is well known, a document of convenience. Execution of a power of attorney in terms of the provisions of the Contract Act as also the Powers-of-Attorney Act is valid. A power of attorney, we have noticed hereinbefore, is executed by the donor so as to enable the donee to act on his behalf. Except in cases where power of attorney is coupled with interest, it is revocable. The donee in exercise of his power under such power of attorney only acts in place of the donor subject of course to the powers granted to him by reason thereof. He cannot use the power of attorney for his own benefit. He acts in a fiduciary capacity. Any act of infidelity or breach of trust is a matter between the donor and the donee." 
An attorney holder may however execute a deed of conveyance in exercise of the power granted under the power of attorney and convey title on behalf of the grantor. 

Scope of Will 

14. A will is the testament of the testator. It is a posthumous disposition of the estate of the testator directing distribution of his estate upon his death. It is not a transfer inter vivos. The two essential characteristics of a will are that it is intended to come into effect only after the death of the testator and is revocable at any time during the life time of the testator. It is said that so long as the testator is alive, a will is not be worth the paper on which it is written, as the testator can at any time revoke it. If the testator, who is not married, marries after making the will, by operation of law, the will stands revoked. (see sections 69 and 70 of Indian Succession Act, 1925). Registration of a will does not make it any more effective. 


15. Therefore, a SA/GPA/WILL transaction does not convey any title nor create any interest in an immovable property. The observations by the Delhi High Court, in Asha M. Jain v. Canara Bank - 94 (2001) DLT 841, that the "concept of power of attorney sales have been recognized as a mode of transaction" when dealing with transactions by way of SA/GPA/WILL are unwarranted and not justified, unintendedly misleading the general public into thinking that SA/GPA/WILL transactions are some kind of a recognized or accepted mode of transfer and that it can be a valid substitute for a sale deed. Such decisions to the extent they recognize or accept SA/GPA/WILL transactions as concluded transfers, as contrasted from an agreement to transfer, are not good law. 

16. We therefore reiterate that immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature of `GPA sales' or `SA/GPA/WILL transfers' do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognized or valid mode of transfer of immoveable property. The courts will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor create any interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognized as deeds of title, except to the limited extent of section 53A of the TP Act. Such transactions cannot be relied upon or made the basis for mutations in Municipal or Revenue Records. What is stated above will apply not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only under a registered Assignment of Lease. It is time that an end is put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/WILL transactions known as GPA sales. 

17. It has been submitted that making declaration that GPA sales and SA/GPA/WILL transfers are not legally valid modes of transfer is likely to create hardship to a large number of persons who have entered into such transactions and they should be given sufficient time to regularize the transactions by obtaining deeds of conveyance. It is also submitted that this decision should be made applicable prospectively to avoid hardship. 

18. We have merely drawn attention to and reiterated the well-settled legal position that SA/GPA/WILL transactions are not `transfers' or `sales' and that such transactions cannot be treated as completed transfers or conveyances. They can continue to be treated as existing agreement of sale. Nothing prevents affected parties from getting registered Deeds of Conveyance to complete their title. The said `SA/GPA/WILL transactions' may also be used to obtain specific performance or to defend possession under section 53A of TP Act. If they are entered before this day, they may be relied upon to apply for regularization of allotments/leases by Development Authorities. We make it clear that if the documents relating to `SA/GPA/WILL transactions' has been accepted acted upon by DDA or other developmental authorities or by the Municipal or revenue authorities to effect mutation, they need not be disturbed, merely on account of this decision. 

19. We make it clear that our observations are not intended to in any way affect the validity of sale agreements and powers of attorney executed in genuine transactions. For example, a person may give a power of attorney to his spouse, son, daughter, brother, sister or a relative to manage his affairs or to execute a deed of conveyance. A person may enter into a development agreement with a land developer or builder for developing the land either by forming plots or by constructing apartment buildings and in that behalf execute an agreement of sale and grant a Power of Attorney empowering the developer to execute agreements of sale or conveyances in regard to individual plots of land or undivided shares in the land relating to apartments in favour of prospective purchasers. In several States, the execution of such development agreements and powers of attorney are already regulated by law and subjected to specific stamp duty. Our observations regarding `SA/GPA/WILL transactions' are not intended to apply to such bonafide/genuine transactions. 
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