This snippet deals with the Law relating to concept of Tenant by 'Holding Over' and 'Sufferance' as provided under the Transfer of Property Act. In Inmacs Ltd. v. Prema Sinha & Ors., the Delhi High Court has culled out the entire law pertaining to tenancy vis-a-vis the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act;
12. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines a lease of an immovable property as a transfer of a right to enjoy immovable property for a certain time, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee who accepts the transfer on such terms. The transferor is called the lessor and the transferee is called the lessee. The price is called the premium and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent.
13. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 deals with the duration of leases and states that in the absence of a contract, or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six month's notice and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee by 15 days' notice. Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 stipulates that a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding 1 year can be made only by and under a registered instrument. Law is clear. If a lease is evidence by a contract, as in the instant case, the duration of the lease would be as per the contract and at the expiry of the lease period as per contract the lease expires by efflux of time. Expiry of lease by efflux of time results in the determination of the relationship between the lessor and the lessee and since the lease expires under the contract by efflux of time, no notice of determination of the lease is required.
14. Once a lease expires, the mandate of clause q of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 makes it the bounden duty of the lessee to put the lessor into possession of the leased premises.
15. To the extent aforenoted there is no problem in law, but as in the present case, more often than not, rent is tendered post expiry of the lease period by efflux of time and accepted by the landlord. What happens”16. Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 reads as under:- “116. Effect of holding over-If a lessee or under-lessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal representative accepts rent from the lessee or under-lessee, or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in section 106.”
17. On the strength of having paid the last agreed rent the tenant is naturally expected to claim that his status is that of a tenant holding over and till tenancy is determined by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 the status continues.
18. As noted above, mandate of clause q of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 is that on the expiry of the lease the lessee is bound to hand over possession of the leased premises to the lessor and therefore the lessor would be entitled to maintain an action to compel the lessees to abide by the mandate of clause q of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882.
19. A person who enters upon the property of another without authority of law is a trespasser. It could be argued that the very next moment after the period of lease stands expired the act of entering upon property by the tenant is an act of trespass. But law says no. A lessee who continues in possession after expiry of the lease, without the consent of the lessor or without any agreement between the parties or in disagreement with the lessor, is treated in law as a tenant by sufferance. But where the lessor consents to the continued possession of lessee on the same terms and conditions as per the original lease a tenancy by holding over comes into operation.
20. The words “accepts rent or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession” in Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act contemplates that from the side of the lessee there should be an offer to take a new lease and on the side of the lessor there must be a definite consent to the continuation of possession. In other words there must be a bilateral contract.
21. Such a bilateral contract could be express or implied. Thus mere continuance of possession after the expiry or determination of the lease is not enough to entitle the tenant to establish tenancy by holding over.
22. More often than not, the only evidence which surfaces is the tender of rent and its acceptance by the landlord. As observed in the decision reported as AIR 1951 SC 285, Eastern Investment Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax the acceptance of rent is only one form of the assent of the lessor to the lessee remaining in possession of the property. But, as observed in the decision reported as AIR 1949 FC 124, Kai Khushroo Bezonjee Capadia Vs. Bai Jerbai Hirjibhoy Warden and Anr., the acceptance must be of rent as such.
23. Since law requires a bilateral agreement between the parties for the tenant continuing to holding over, offer and acceptance of rent is at best an evidence raising a presumption of assent but would not amount to a conclusive proof of such assent. It could be rebutted by other evidence.
24. In order that the acceptance of rent may amount to assent of the lessor it has to be shown that the offer of rent was made on the express ground that the lessee intended to continue the lease and that the acceptance was with the full knowledge of the nature of the offer. This is a question of fact which has to be determined from the circumstances of each case. Greater is the period of continued possession coupled with receipt of rent, stronger would be the presumption in favour of the lessee.
25. Where a tenant fails to establish a case of holding over, his status would be, as noted above, that of a tenant at sufferance. The difference in the status of a tenant holding over and a tenant at sufferance was explained by the Supreme Court in the decision reported as AIR 1996 SC 140, R.V. Bhupal Prasad Vs. State of A.P. wherein their Lordships said:- “8. Tenant at sufferance is one who comes into possession of land by lawful title, but who holds it by wrong after the termination of the term or expiry of the lease by efflux of time. The tenant at sufferance is, therefore, one who wrongfully continues in possession after the extinction of a lawful title. There is little difference between him and a trespasser. In Mulla”s Transfer of Property Act (7th Edn.) at page 633, the position of tenancy at sufferance has been stated thus: A tenancy at sufferance is merely a fiction to avoid continuance in possession operating as a trespass. It has been described as the least and lowest interest which can subsist in reality. It, therefore, cannot be created by contract and arises only by implication of law when a person who has been in possession under a lawful title continues in possession after that title has been determined, without the consent of the person entitled. A tenancy at sufferance does not create the relationship of landlord and tenant. At page 769, it is stated regarding the right of a tenant holding over thus: The act of holding over after the expiration of the term does not necessarily create a tenancy of any kind. If the lessee remaining in possession after the determination of the term, the common law rule is that he is a tenant on sufferance. The expression “holding over” is used in the sense of retaining possession. A distinction should be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the lease, without the consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so with the land-lord”s consent. The former is called a tenant by sufferance in the language of English law and the latter class of tenants is called a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. The lessee holding over with the consent of the lessor is in a better position than a mere tenant at will. The tenancy on sufferance is converted into a tenancy at will by the assent of the landlord, but the relationship of the landlord and tenant is not established until the rent was paid and accepted. The assent of the landlord to the continuance of the tenancy after the determination of the tenancy would create a new tenancy. The possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law. Although he may not have a right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, his possession is juridical. 13. In view of the settled possession of law, the possession of the appellant is as tenant at sufferance and is liable to ejectment in due course of law. But his possession is not legal nor lawful. In other words, his possession of the theatre is unlawful or litiguous possession. The appellant may remain in possession until he is ejected in due course in execution of the decree in the suit filed by the respondent. His possession cannot be considered to be settled possession. He is akin to a trespasser, though initially he had lawful entry.”
26. Dealing with the issue whether accepting rent after serving upon the tenant a notice to quote amounts to a waiver under Section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act, in the decision reported as 2006 (4) SCC 205, Sarup Singh Gupta Vs. S. Jagdish, their Lordships of Supreme Court held:- “6 “ A mere perusal of Section 113 leaves no room for doubt that in a given case, a notice given under Section 111, Clause (h), may be treated as having been waived, but the necessary condition is that there must be some act on the part of the person giving the notice evincing an intention to treat the lease as subsisting. Of course, the express or implied consent of the person to whom such notice is given must also be established. The question as to whether the person giving the notice has by his act shown an intention to treat the lease as subsisting is essentially a question of fact. In reaching a conclusion on this aspect of the matter, the Court must consider all relevant facts and circumstances, and the mere fact that rent has been tendered and accepted, cannot be determinative. 7 A somewhat similar situation arose in the case reported in Shanti Prasad Devi vs Shankar Mahto 2005 (5) SCC 543. That was a case where the landlord accepted rent even on expiry of the period of lease. A submission was urged on behalf of the tenant in that case that Section 116, Transfer of Property Act was attracted and there was a deemed renewal, of the lease. Negativing the contention, this Court observed that mere acceptance of rent for the subsequent months in which the lessee continued to occupy the premise even, after the expiry of the period of the lease, cannot be said to be a conduct signifying his assent to the continuing of the lease even after the expiry of the lease period. Their Lordships noticed the conditions incorporated in the agreement itself, which provided for renewal of the lease and held that those conditions having not been fulfilled, the mere acceptance of rent after expiry of period of lease did not signify assent to the continuance of the lease. 8 In the instant case, as we have noticed earlier, two notices to quit were given on 10th February, 1979 and 17th March, 1979. The suit was filed on 2-6-1979. The tenant offered and the landlord accepted the rent for the months of April, May and thereafter. The question is whether this by itself constitute an act on the part of the landlord showing an intention to treat the lease as subsisting. In our view, mere acceptance of rent did not by itself constituted an act of the nature envisaged by Section 113, Transfer of Property Act showing an intention to treat the lease as subsisting. The fact remains that even after accepting the rent tendered, the landlord did file a suit for eviction, and even while prosecuting the suit accepted rent which was being paid to him by the tenant. It cannot, therefore, be said that by accepting rent, he intended to waive the notice to quit and to treat the lease as subsisting. We cannot ignore the fact that in any event, even if rent was neither tendered nor accepted, the landlord in the event of success would be entitled to the payment of the arrears of rent. To avoid any controversy, in the event of termination of lease the practice followed by courts is to permit the landlord to receive each month by way of compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, an amount equal to the monthly rent payable by the tenant. It cannot, therefore, be said that mere acceptance of rent amounts to waiver of notice to quit unless there be any other evidence to prove or establish that the landlord so intended. In the instant case, we find no other fact or circumstance to support the plea of waiver. On the contrary the filing of and prosecution of the eviction proceeding by the landlord suggests otherwise.” 27. In the report published as 2006 (1) SCC 228, C. Albert Morris vs K. Chandrasekaran it was observed as under:- “26 “ Much argument was advanced on the receipt of the rent by the landlord after the cancellation of the lease. The consensus of judicial opinion in this country is that a mere continuance in occupation of the demised premises after the expiry of the lease, notwithstanding the receipt of an amount by the quondam landlord would not create a tenancy so as to confer on the erstwhile tenant the status of tenant or a right to be in possession. “ 32 “ We are, therefore, of the opinion that mere acceptance of rent by the landlord, the first respondent herein, from the tenant in possession after the lease has been determined either by efflux of time or by notice to quit would not create a tenancy so as to confer on the erstwhile tenant the status of a tenant or a right to be in possession. We answer this issue accordingly.”
28. Similar view has been expressed in the decisions reported as 2005 (5) SCC 543 Shanti Prasad Devi Vs. Shankar Mahto, 129 (2006) DLT 338 Central Bank of India Vs. Lalit Kumar Bhargava, 118 (2005) DLT 52 Yashbir Sharma Vs. Mrs. Sulakshna Lal, 104 (2003) DLT 158 Delhi Jal Board Vs. Surendra P.Malik, 2002 (5) AD (Delhi) 7 FCI Vs. Kuljinder Pal Singh Dhillon and 99 (2002) DLT 139”Sh.Prithvi Raj Bhalla Vs. Industrial Cables (India) Ltd.
29. It would be interesting to note that in the decision reported as (1973) 2 SCC 388, Bari Lal vs. Municipal Corporation of Indore the tenant continued in possession for nearly 5 years after expiry of the lease and yet was held to be not holding over. Status held was of a tenant by sufferance. Meaning thereby that mere time duration of occupation post tenancy coming to an end by efflux of time is not a very determinative factor.